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On the Centrality of the Concept of an Altered State to 
Definitions of Hypnosis.
Graham F. Wagstaff, PhD *
Compilers of most dictionaries and encyclopaedias seem to have similar views on the fundamental 
defining characteristic of hypnosis: it is an altered state of consciousness.  In contrast, experts in the 
field of hypnosis continue to have in difficulty in coming up with definitions of hypnosis and relat-
ed terminology on which all can agree.  In this paper, it is argued that a major problem in reaching 
agreement amongst experts on these issues is that, in an attempt to accommodate different theo-
retical viewpoints, we have lost sight of the etymological origins of terms used when discussing the 
nature of hypnosis and related phenomena (terms such as hypnosis, hypnotism, hypnotizability, 
hypnotic induction etc.).  As a result, hypnosis and related terms are often defined and applied in 
disparate ways that do not coherently relate to each other.  Some examples illustrative of the general 
problems are given, and attention is drawn to some possible ways of defining hypnosis and related 
terminology that acknowledge and maintain the essential features of the original definitions, yet 
are consistent with different modern explanatory frameworks.  The main conclusion drawn is that 
the concept of an altered state should be central to any definition of hypnosis. 
Foreword
This paper is about the definition of hypnosis and 
related terminology, and why authorities in the 
area continue to experience difficulty in reaching 
agreement on definitions of the relevant terms. It 
is argued that one of the major problems, if not 
the major problem, in reaching agreement on 
the definition of hypnosis, is that, in an attempt 
to accommodate different theoretical explana-
tions, we have confused definition and explana-
tion, and thereby lost sight of the etymological 
origins of terms we use in relation to hypnosis 
and related phenomena (terms such as hypnosis, 
hypnotism, hypnotizability, hypnotic induction 
etc.).  Consequently, hypnosis and related terms 
are often defined and applied in ways that do not 
coherently relate to each other.   However, it is 
suggested that by acknowledging these issues, it 
may be possible to come up with some ways of 
defining hypnosis and related terminology that, 
whilst acknowledging and maintaining the essen-
tial features of the original definitions, are never-
theless, broadly consistent with different modern 
explanatory frameworks.  If the arguments pre-
sented have any merit, perhaps the most signifi-
cant conclusion to be drawn is that, regardless of 
one’s theoretical perspective, the concept of an 
altered state should be a core feature of any defi-
nition of hypnosis.  
Introduction
It is now commonly acknowledged that, although 
the terms ‘hypnotism’, ‘hypnotic’, and ‘hypnotist’, 
were first used by James Braid in the 1840s, re-
lated  terms such as, ‘hypnologie’, ‘hypnotique’ 
and ‘hypnologiste’, had been publicised and used 
in France some 20 years earlier by Etienne Félix 
d’Hénin de Cuvillers (Braid, 1843, 1846; Hénin de 
Cuvillers, 1820; Gravitz, 1993).  Both Hénin de 
Cuvillers and Braid used the prefix ‘hypn’, from 
the Greek ‘hupnos’ meaning sleep, to apply to a 
condition previously reported by the early mag-
netists, known variously as ‘magnetic sleep’, ‘ar-
tificial somnambulism’, or ‘lucid sleep’, in which 
subjects adopted the appearance of someone in a 
somnambulistic state, and showed evidence of a 
range of unusual behaviours and experiences (see, 
for example, Hénin de Cuvillers, 1820).  The word 
‘hypnosis’ itself (or ‘hypnose’ in French) seems 
to have appeared somewhat later, by which time 
any connection with actual sleep had largely been 
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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking Glass. 
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abandoned and replaced by the idea that hypnosis 
was an altered psychological state or condition in 
which the subject showed an unusual susceptibili-
ty to suggestions for alterations in experience and 
behaviour (see for example, Bernheim, 1888, 1889; 
Sheehan & Perry, 1976). *
Continuing this tradition, although the link 
with the appearance of sleep is not always made, 
the idea that hypnosis is some kind of altered state 
associated with unusual changes in experience 
and behaviour, overwhelmingly dominates defi-
nitions of hypnosis found in modern dictionaries 
and encyclopaedias.  So, for example, the Oxford 
Dictionaries define hypnosis as, “the induction 
of a state of consciousness in which a person ap-
parently loses the power of voluntary action and 
is highly responsive to suggestion or direction” 
(Hypnosis, 2012d).  Similarly, Webster’s Medical 
Dictionary defines hypnosis as, “a trancelike state 
of altered consciousness that resembles sleep but 
is induced by a person whose suggestions are 
readily accepted by the subject” (Hypnosis, 2012e); 
the Collins English Dictionary as, “an artificially 
induced state of relaxation and concentration in 
which deeper parts of the mind become more 
accessible” (Hypnosis 2012c), and the Chambers 
Dictionary as, “an induced sleep-like state in 
which a person is deeply relaxed, and in which 
the mind responds to external suggestion and 
can recover memories of events thought to have 
been forgotten” (Hypnosis, 2012b).   Moreover, 
although referring to debates about the nature 
of hypnosis, even the electronic encyclopaedia, 
Wikipedia, following Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
defines hypnosis as, “a special psychological state 
with certain physiological attributes, resembling 
sleep only superficially and marked by a function-
ing of the individual at a level of awareness other 
than the ordinary conscious state” (Hypnosis, 
2012f).  (For an extended list of very similar 
quotes from various dictionaries and encyclopae-
dias see Hypnosis, 2012a.)
Apparently, then, compilers of dictionaries 
and encyclopaedias seem to have little difficulty 
in reaching agreement on the fundamental defin-
ing feature of hypnosis; whatever its other char-
acteristics, hypnosis is an altered state of con-
sciousness.  It may seem somewhat surprising, 
therefore, that academics, clinicians and other 
professionals who specialise in hypnosis have so 
much difficulty in coming up with a definition 
on which all can agree.  There are many examples 
and reviews of related debates about the general 
nature of hypnosis in the literature (see, for in-
stance, Barber, 1969; Bowers, 1983; Hilgard, 1973; 
Kirsch, 1991, 2011; Kirsch & Lynn, 1995, 1998; Lynn 
& Rhue, 1991; Mazzoni, Venneri, McGeown, & 
Kirsch, 2013; Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Sheehan & Perry, 
1976; Spanos, 1986; Weitzenhoffer, 1980, 2002; 
Wagstaff, 1998, 2010).  However,  particularly no-
table illustrations of the range of opinions specifi-
cally regarding definition and the use of related 
terminology, are the commentaries in Volume 11 
of Contemporary Hypnosis following the release 
of the 1993 definition and description of hypnosis 
by the American Psychological Association (APA), 
Division of Psychological Hypnosis (1994);  the re-
port of the rationale behind the 2003 APA revised 
definition  of hypnosis (Green, Barabasz, Barrett, 
& Montgomery, 2005), and the more recent dis-
cussion by leading researchers and practitioners 
again in Contemporary Hypnosis  (see Kirsch et 
al., 2011).  Central to most disagreements are views 
concerning whether or not hypnosis should be 
defined with reference to an altered state, the re-
lationship between hypnosis and suggestion, the 
significance of the hypnotic induction procedure, 
and the definitions of related terminology such as 
‘hypnotizability’.  Hence, despite an ever increas-
ing volume of scientific research ostensibly about 
‘hypnosis’, experts in the field still seem to find it 
difficult to define what it exactly is that they are (or 
even should be) investigating or practising.   
So why has finding a consensus definition of 
hypnosis been so difficult? 
Definition, existence and 
explanation
According to most authorities, when we refer 
to the definition of a term, we are usually refer-
ring to its ‘lexical definition’; that is, a statement 
which describes ‘its meaning’.  Hence the Oxford 
Dictionaries state that a definition of a word is, 
“a statement of the exact meaning of a word, es-
pecially in a dictionary” (Definition of definition, 
2012).  However, the essential meanings of most 
terms are not contingent upon the actual exis-
tence of, or explanation for, phenomena related 
to the subject concerned.  For example, the fun-
damental meanings of the terms such as, mental 
telepathy, reincarnation, spiritualism, acupunc-
ture meridians, and Chakras, are not based on 
whether we believe the phenomena ascribed to 
them actually exist, or how we explain the phe-
nomena attributed to them.  Indeed, if attempt 
to ‘neutralise’, or ‘water down’ the definitions of 
terms so that they are compatible with a range of 
different beliefs and explanations, we invariably 
lose the essential meaning of the terms.  Consider 
the following example.
Child: Can you speak to the spirits of the 
dead?
Parent: Personally I don’t think so, but 
some people think you can.
Child: So what is the meaning of the term 
‘spiritualist séance’ then?
 
* Braid does not actually use 
the word ‘hypnosis’ in any of 
his main works. Also, whilst 
acknowledging that the 
hypnotic subject might give 
the appearance of being in a 
state of  a state of somnam-
bulism, Hénin de Cuvillers 
(1820) makes it clear that 
he does not actually believe 
the subject to actually be 
in such a state. Similarly, 
whilst again acknowledging 
the sleep-like appearance of 
the hypnotic subject, Braid 
subsequently abandoned 
the view that there was an 
actual connection between 
the phenomenon and sleep 
(Braid, 1846; Sheehan & 
Perry, 1976).
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Parent: It means when a group of people 
meet, and led by someone called a ‘medi-
um’, they talk about friends and relatives.
The parent’s definition here may be neutral 
or uncontroversial, but surely it has lost the es-
sence that defines a ‘spiritualist séance’.  Of course, 
this does not mean that it is impossible to come 
up with a definition that acknowledges differ-
ent shades of opinion, or that definitions cannot 
change to some extent in response to scientific 
opinion; for example, the Oxford dictionary de-
fines a ‘séance’ as, “a meeting at which people at-
tempt to make contact with the dead, especially 
through the agency of a medium” (my emphasis; 
Definition of séance, 2012).  However, most defi-
nitions tend to maintain core features of the orig-
inal idea.  Thus, in the above example, the idea 
that a séance concerns contact with spirits of the 
dead still remains central to the definition.  But is 
this the case with hypnosis, or are we in danger of 
defining hypnosis in a way that is so ‘neutralised’ 
that its essential characteristics are lost? 
Defining hypnosis: Some 
problems
As an example of some of the relevant prob-
lems, consider the main opening paragraph 
from the 2003 definition of hypnosis provided by 
American Psychological Association, Division of 
Psychological Hypnosis (from Green, Barabasz, 
Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005):
Hypnosis typically involves an introduction 
to the procedure during which the subject is told 
that suggestions for imaginative experiences will 
be presented.  The hypnotic induction is an ex-
tended initial suggestion for using one’s imagina-
tion, and may contain further elaborations of the 
introduction.  A hypnotic procedure is used to 
encourage and evaluate responses to suggestions. 
When using hypnosis, one person (the subject) 
is guided by another (the hypnotist) to respond 
to suggestions for changes in subjective experi-
ence, alterations in perception, sensation, emo-
tion, thought or behaviour.  Persons can also learn 
self-hypnosis, which is the act of administering 
hypnotic procedures on one’s own.  If the subject 
responds to hypnotic suggestions, it is generally 
inferred that hypnosis has been induced.  Many 
believe that hypnotic responses and experiences 
are characteristic of a hypnotic state.  While some 
think that it is not necessary to use the word hyp-
nosis as part of the hypnotic induction, others 
view it as essential. (p. 262)
In this definition it says, “The hypnotic in-
duction is an extended initial suggestion for using 
one’s imagination, and may contain further elab-
orations of the introduction”, and, “A hypnotic 
procedure is used to encourage and evaluate re-
sponses to suggestions”.  But it is not clear what 
exactly these statements mean.  For example, 
suppose we have two suggestions for using one’s 
imagination; if we extend the first, does the pro-
cedure then become hypnosis? And are we to as-
sume that any procedure that encourages people 
to respond to suggestions, like Barber’s (1969) 
task-motivational instructions condition, is ‘hyp-
notic’?  The definition also says, “If the subject 
responds to hypnotic suggestions, it is generally 
inferred that hypnosis has been induced”.  But, 
unless the term hypnotic ‘suggestion’ is used tau-
tologically (‘suggested suggestions’), this seems 
to imply that one can have non-hypnotic sugges-
tions too.  So, does this mean that you are hypno-
tized only if you respond to hypnotic (as distinct 
from non-hypnotic suggestions)? And if so, we 
need to know the nature of the distinction.  If it is 
a distinction between suggestion with or without 
‘hypnosis’, we still need a definition of ‘hypnosis’. 
And, in this statement, it is not clear what has 
been induced.  The definition refers mainly to a 
procedure; we do not normally talk about ‘induc-
ing’ a procedure.  
 Consider also this more recent definition 
of hypnosis from the website of the American 
Psychological Association (2012): 
According to the American Psychological 
Association (APA)’s Division of Psychological 
Hypnosis, hypnosis is a procedure during which 
a health professional or researcher suggests 
while treating someone that he or she experience 
changes in sensations, perceptions, thoughts, or 
behaviour.  Although some hypnosis is used to 
make people more alert, most hypnosis includes 
suggestions for relaxation, calmness, and well-
being.  Instructions to imagine or think about 
pleasant experiences are also commonly included 
during hypnosis.  People respond to hypnosis in 
different ways.  Some describe hypnosis as a state 
of focused attention, in which they feel very calm 
and relaxed.  Most people describe the experience 
as pleasant.
Now compare this with a standard descrip-
tion of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
for pain management such as the following from 
Keefe (1996):
Training is provided in wide variety of cog-
nitive and behavioural pain coping strategies. 
Progressive relaxation and cue-controlled brief 
relaxation exercises are used to decrease muscle 
tension, reduce emotional distress, and divert at-
tention from pain…  Training in distraction tech-
niques such as pleasant imagery, counting meth-
ods, and use of a focal point helps patients learn to 
divert attention away from severe pain episodes. 
Cognitive restructuring is used to help patients 
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identify and challenge overly negative pain-re-
lated thoughts and to replace these thoughts with 
more adaptive, coping thoughts.  (p. 4)
From reading these latter two descriptions, 
it seems very difficult to identify the component 
that essentially differentiates ‘hypnosis’ from CBT, 
other than perhaps a greater emphasis on ‘sugges-
tion’ in the APA definition.  
It seems fairly clear that the main reason why 
the two APA definitions of hypnosis are problem-
atic is that both are attempting to provide a defi-
nition or description of hypnosis that is relatively 
non-committal with regard to the controversial 
issue of whether, when explaining hypnotic phe-
nomena, we need to invoke the idea of a trance 
or altered state.  That is, the idea is to produce a 
definition of hypnosis that can stand regardless of 
whether the concept of trance or altered state, is 
included or not.  Significantly, if one accepts the 
idea of a hypnotic state or trance, the difficulties 
do not arise.  For example, if hypnosis is defined 
in terms of an altered state, a hypnotic induction 
procedure is not just an extended initial sugges-
tion to use one’s imagination, or an attempt to 
motivate the subject to respond, it is a procedure 
specifically designed to induce the altered state of 
hypnosis.  The difference between hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic suggestions is also made clear; they 
are suggestions with and without the presence of 
the hypnotic state.  Moreover, the entity that has 
been induced when people respond to hypnotic 
suggestions is the hypnotic state, and the essential 
difference between hypnotherapy and CBT (other 
than perhaps the emphasis on suggestion), is that 
the former augments the therapy with the induc-
tion of a hypnotic state, whereas ordinary CBT 
does not.  
In contrast, a more or less inevitable conse-
quence of avoiding the concept of trance or state 
in definitions of hypnosis is that, even if uninten-
tional, this will tend to align hypnosis more or less 
exclusively with suggestion; i.e. hypnosis = giving 
suggestions; if you respond to suggestions you are 
‘hypnotized’ etc. (hence, phrases like, “The hyp-
notic induction is an extended initial suggestion 
for using one’s imagination”).  A similar observa-
tion could be made with regard to the opening 
summary description of hypnosis in the report 
by the British Psychological Society (2001) on the 
nature of hypnosis, which is as follows.  
The term ‘hypnosis’ denotes an interaction 
between one person, the ‘hypnotist’, and another 
person or people, the ‘subject’ or ‘subjects’.  In this 
interaction the hypnotist attempts to influence 
the subjects’ perceptions, feelings, thinking and 
behaviour by asking them to concentrate on ideas 
and images that may evoke the intended effects. 
The verbal communications that the hypnotist 
uses to achieve these effects are termed ‘sugges-
tions’.  Suggestions differ from everyday kinds 
of instructions in that a ‘successful’ response is 
experienced by the subject as having a quality of 
involuntariness or effortlessness.  Subjects may 
learn to go through the hypnotic procedures on 
their own, and this is termed ‘self hypnosis’.  (p. 1)
This is problematic, because, although 
some have actually defined hypnosis solely in 
terms of suggestion, for example, Persinger 
(1996) uses phrases such as, “the capacity to 
be hypnotized — suggestibility” (p. 283), and, 
“Hypnotizability or suggestibility” (p. 284), there 
are a variety of very familiar and long standing ar-
guments against the simple equation of hypnosis 
with suggestion. 
Is hypnosis the same thing as 
suggestion? 
The equation of hypnosis and suggestion ignores 
the fact that many authorities, both academics 
and clinicians, argue that there is a meaningful 
distinction to be made between hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic suggestion, or hypnotic and wak-
ing suggestibility (i.e. suggestion with and with-
out hypnosis).  For instance, Evans (1967) states, 
“Waking and hypnotic suggestibility are concep-
tually, and quite probably empirically distinct” 
(p.  144).  And Sheehan and Perry (1976) state, 
“Although the link between hypnosis and suggest-
ibility is an important one . . . the two concepts are 
not to be identified . . . reports from subjects about 
their experience of trance forbid the simple equa-
tion of suggestibility and hypnosis” (pp. 46–47). 
Similarly, Bowers (1983) says, “Hypnosis cannot 
be reduced to suggestibility . . . deep hypnosis in-
volves an altered state of consciousness” (p.  105). 
(See also Hilgard, 1973, 1986; Hilgard & Hilgard, 
1983; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Kirsch & Braffman, 
1999; Orne, 1959; Wagstaff, 1998; Wagstaff, Cole 
& Brunas-Wagstaff, 2008; Weitzenhoffer, 1980, 
2002.) Accordingly, numerous theorists, both 
past and present, have argued that ‘hypnosis’  is 
not identical in meaning to ‘suggestion’ or ‘sug-
gestibility’, or ‘administering suggestions’, rather 
it is an altered state or condition that is associ-
ated with changes in suggestibility such that expe-
riences and behaviours are altered in some way. 
Moreover, the change in suggestibility that is most 
typically associated with the presence of hypnosis 
is one in the direction of increased suggestibility, 
or hypersuggestibility.  So, for example, Bernheim 
(1889) states, “I define hypnotism as the induc-
tion of a peculiar psychical condition which in-
creases the susceptibility to suggestion” (p.  15). 
Similarly, Hull (1933) says, “However different 
may be the theoretical bias of the various writers, 
and however varying may be their interpretation 
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of the phenomenon, there appears to be no dis-
agreement regarding the fundamental fact that 
whatever else it may be, the hypnotic trance is a 
state of heightened susceptibility to suggestion”. 
Erickson (1989) also states, “It (hypnosis) is a state 
of consciousness or awareness in which there is 
a marked receptiveness to ideas and understand-
ings and an increased willingness to respond 
either positively or negatively to those ideas’ 
(p. 224).  And Hilgard and Hilgard (1983) remark, 
“For highly hypnotizable subjects waking sugges-
tion was not as successful as hypnotic suggestion” 
(p. 182).  The idea that hypnosis is a condition re-
lated to high responsiveness to suggestion is also 
implicit in Kallio & Revonsuo’s (2003) statement 
that, in as much as it exists, ‘the ASC (altered state 
of consciousness) of hypnosis is a rare phenom-
enon realized only in virtuosos” (p. 149);i.e. those 
highly responsive to suggestions.
What many would consider to be the clas-
sic relationship between hypnosis and suggest-
ibility is well indicated in the model described 
in the Hypnosis Unit UK website, which states 
that, “Hypnosis has often been carved into two 
separate elements — Trance and Suggestion” 
(Hypnosis Unit UK, 2012; see also, Heap, 1996). 
According to this view, suggestion of itself is not 
‘hypnotic’, rather what defines suggestion as hyp-
notic is the presence of the ‘hypnotic trance’ or 
altered state.  Hence HUUK say, “People respond 
better to suggestions while in hypnosis”.  In other 
words, hypnosis is not just ‘responding to sugges-
tions’; otherwise the HUUK statement would be-
come, ‘people respond better to suggestions while 
responding to suggestions’.
Indeed, if one attempts to incorporate con-
cepts like trance and hypnotic induction with 
a definition of hypnosis which equates hypno-
sis with suggestion, the results can be semanti-
cally and conceptually confusing.  For example, 
if we define hypnosis as suggestion, and then 
include the concepts such as hypnotic induc-
tion and trance, it is easy to end up with terms 
such as ‘hypnotic hypnosis’ and ‘non-hypnotic’ 
or ‘waking hypnosis’; indeed, there are examples 
of this in the literature (see Wells, 1924; Cade & 
Woolley-Hart, 1974).  Of these, the term ‘wak-
ing hypnosis’ is perhaps most common (Wells, 
1924; Capafons & Mendoza, 2010).  If hypnosis is 
equated with suggestion, then presumably ‘wak-
ing hypnosis’ means the same thing as ‘waking 
suggestion’.  However, this is not how to term 
is usually applied.  For example, Capafons and 
Mendoza (2010) argue that ‘waking hypnosis’ is 
not the same as ‘waking suggestion’.  Rather ‘wak-
ing’ hypnosis is hypnosis with an ‘alert’ induction 
procedure, or ‘waking-alert’ induction procedure. 
Hence the distinction is more like: ‘hypnotic 
suggestion’ (hypnosis with ‘waking/alert’ or ‘re-
laxed/not alert’ induction), versus non-hypnotic 
or ‘waking suggestion’ (which is suggestion with-
out any hypnotic induction); see also, Cardeña, 
Alarcón, Capafons, and Bayot, (1998). 
However, the terminology becomes even 
more complex and contorted if one attempts to 
identify hypnosis with particular kinds of sugges-
tions, such as primary suggestions (for relevant 
discussion see, for example, Hilgard, 1973; Kirsch 
et al., 2011; Wagstaff, 1981).  For example, Kirsch 
et al. (2011) state, “hypnosis can also be defined 
more broadly as the administration (or self-ad-
ministration) and experience of primary sugges-
tions, regardless of whether a trance induction 
has been administered” (p.  110).   The standard 
rationale for this would be that the general term 
‘suggestion’ includes types of suggestion which 
are not normally associated with the ‘domain’ 
of hypnosis, such as forms of social suggestibil-
ity (conformity and gullibility), often referred to 
as Type 2, or secondary suggestions (see, for ex-
ample, Eysenck & Furneaux, 1945; Hilgard, 1973; 
Stukat, 1958).  But, if we define hypnosis as pri-
mary suggestion, and non-hypnosis as secondary 
suggestion, and then add hypnotic induction or 
trance, potentially we could have: ‘hypnotic hyp-
nosis’ and ‘non-hypnotic/waking hypnosis’ (for 
primary suggestions), and, ‘hypnotic non-hypno-
sis’, and ‘non-hypnotic/waking non-hypnosis’ (for 
secondary suggestions).  
At the root of the problem here is the fact that 
terms like ‘hypnotic trance’ and ‘hypnotic induc-
tion’ were historically derived from the idea that 
hypnosis is, by definition, an altered state which 
can be induced using various induction proce-
dures; i.e. thus a hypnotic induction procedure is 
procedure designed to induce a hypnotic state (see 
for example, Braid, 1843; Bramwell, 1906; Bowers, 
1983; LeCron, 1953; Sheehan & Perry, 1976; Shor, 
Orne & O’Connell, 1962; Tart & Hilgard, 1966; 
Tart, 1966, 1970; Weitzenhoffer, 1953; Wagstaff 
et al., 2008).  Hence, correspondingly, ‘hypnotic 
suggestion’ was simply suggestion in the presence 
of the hypnotic state, and ‘waking suggestion’ 
(non-hypnotic suggestion) was suggestion with-
out the presence of the hypnotic state.  Within the 
context of this terminology, therefore, concepts 
such as ‘hypnotic hypnosis’ and ‘non-hypnotic’ or 
‘waking hypnosis’, would be viewed as contradic-
tions in terms.    
What happened to ‘hypno-
tism’?
Another potential source of conceptual and se-
mantic confusion is the term ‘hypnotism’.  One 
finds less reference to ‘hypnotism’ in the mod-
ern literature; however, according to Pekala et al. 
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(2010), there is still a meaningful distinction to be 
made between hypnosis and hypnotism.  Pekala 
et al. argue that hypnosis refers to a ‘trance state’, 
defined as, “the subjective state the highly hypno-
tizable person reports in response to a hypnotic 
induction” (p.  276); whereas ‘hypnotism’ con-
cerns the combination of hypnosis with ‘sugges-
tion’ (p. 273). 
However, this distinction is potentially prob-
lematic, as it seems to imply that theories that 
argue that suggestion is a defining feature of hyp-
nosis, such those of as Liébeault (1886), Bernheim 
(1889) and Hull (1933), are not actually theories 
of ‘hypnosis’, they are theories of ‘hypnotism’. 
Moreover, any theory that describes the science, 
art or practice of using induction procedures to 
produce hypnotic ‘trance’ experiences and related 
phenomena, but without the introduction of, or 
reference to, suggestion as a fundamental feature 
of the induction of trance, such as that of Charcot 
(see Ellenberger, 1970; Sheehan & Perry, 1976), is a 
theory of ‘hypnosis’, but not of ‘hypnotism’.
Again, at the root of this difficulty is the 
failure to link the term hypnotism with its his-
torical origins.  Historically, ‘hypnotism’, or 
‘l’hypnotisme’, was simply the term applied to the 
study or practice of inducing and using the state 
of hypnosis.*  Indeed, this original usage again 
dominates definitions of the term in dictionar-
ies and encyclopaedias; hence Webster’s Medical 
Dictionary defines hypnotism as ‘the study or act 
of inducing hypnosis’ (Hypnotism, 2012a), and 
Collins English Dictionary defines it as, “1 the 
scientific study and practice of hypnosis, and, 2 
the process of inducing hypnosis” (Hypnotism, 
2012b).  In as much as the practice of hypnotism 
has traditionally involved the use of sugges-
tions both to induce the proposed hypnotic state 
(‘hypnosis’), and demonstrate the achievement 
of the state, one can see why some might now 
construe hypnotism as ‘trance with suggestion’. 
But, according to historical perspectives, one 
could, nevertheless, practice hypnotism with-
out using suggestion, at least in principle.  So, 
for example, Charcot, like other followers of the 
Salpêtrière School, still practised hypnotism (in-
deed, he founded the ‘Revue de l‘Hypnotisme’), 
but believed that the hypnotic trance could be 
induced mechanically without suggestion, and 
that its main manifestations were relatively fixed 
reactions of the nervous system (Ellenberger, 
1970; Sheehan & Perry, 1976).  
In this context, it also perhaps worth noting 
that, it we apply this kind of etymological distinc-
tion between hypnosis and hypnotism, the BPS 
and APA descriptions of hypnosis could perhaps 
be more accurately described as statements about 
‘hypnotism’ rather then ‘hypnosis’; that is, they 
describe what a hypnotist does, rather than define 
hypnosis per se, or the ‘essence’ of hypnosis, to 
use Orne’s (1959) terminology.
What is hypnotizability?
Confusion regarding the distinctions between 
hypnosis as suggestion, and hypnosis as an al-
tered state, is also apparent in the use of the 
term ‘hypnotizability’.  For example, a number 
of researchers have drawn a distinction between 
‘hypnotic or trance depth’, measured by hypnotic 
depth reports, and ‘hypnotizability’, measured 
by response to hypnotic suggestions.  From this 
viewpoint, hypnotic depth and hypnotizability 
are fundamentally different constructs.  Thus, 
whereas depth refers to the degree of trance or 
state involvement at a particular time, hypnotiz-
ability refers to the skill or talent a person has that 
enables him or her to respond to hypnotic tasks 
(see for example, Hilgard, 1981; Pekala et al., 2010; 
Sheehan & McConkey, 1982; Tart, 1970).  Hence 
Hilgard (1981) famously argued that, ‘The pur-
pose of the Stanford scales was to measure hyp-
notic talent, not hypnotic depth’ (p. 27).  Used in 
this way, the term ‘hypnotizability’ seems to refer 
more to what used to be called ‘hypnotic  suggest-
ibility’, as distinct from ‘hypnotic susceptibility’, 
which was the older term used in relation to the 
more general idea of the ability to ‘enter hypno-
sis’ or ‘enter the hypnotic state’ (for a detailed ac-
count of this distinction, see Bowers, 1983).
However, if hypnotic depth refers to involve-
ment in trance, and hypnotizability does not, 
there seems to be something wrong with the ter-
minology here (Wagstaff et al., 2008, 2010).  For 
example, a number of theorists have considered 
the possibility that, although hypnosis is normal-
ly associated with hypersuggestibility, for some 
extremely hypnotically susceptible individuals 
(somnambules), the experience of hypnosis may 
be so profound that suggestibility may be signifi-
cantly diminished with hypnosis (Bowers, 1983; 
Hilgard and Tart, 1966; Shor, 1962; White, 1937; 
see also, Spanos, Cobb & Gorassini, 1985; Silva & 
Kirsch, 1987).  But if we adopt the  previous dis-
tinction between hypnotic depth and hypnotiz-
ability, there is nothing inconsistent in saying that 
such participants are so ‘deeply hypnotized’ (or in 
such a profound ‘state of hypnosis’), that they are 
‘less hypnotizable', or even 'unhypnotizable’.
As noted elsewhere (Wagstaff, 2010; Wagstaff 
et al., 2008), the problem here seems to arise 
from a confusion between what Bowers (1983) 
terms, ‘the indicator and what is being indicated’ 
(p. 92).  Again, as originally conceived, hypnotic 
depth was associated with the idea that hypno-
sis involves an altered state of consciousness or 
trance with various degrees of depth, and the 
 
*As previously noted, this 
distinction is not apparent 
in Braid’s terminology; it 
is, however, apparent by 
the 1880s, as in Bernheim’s 
(1888,1889) use of the words 
‘hypnose’ and ‘hypnotisme’.
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deeper one goes into this state the more suggest-
ible one becomes (Bernheim, 1889; Bowers, 1983; 
LeCron, 1953; Sheehan and Perry, 1976; Sheehan 
& McConkey, 1982; Shor, Orne and O’Connell, 
1962; Tart and Hilgard, 1966; Tart, 1966, 1970; 
Weitzenhoffer, 1953).  Hence, as Bowers points 
out, in this way, responsiveness to hypnotic sug-
gestions or tasks was originally viewed as an indi-
cator of the degree or depth of ‘hypnosis’ (altered 
state) that the subject can achieve or has achieved. 
And, accordingly, by measuring participants’ re-
sponsiveness to a set of suggestions that increase 
in difficulty, one could determine their level of 
hypnotic depth.  In this way, it was assumed that 
hypnotic suggestibility (responsiveness to sugges-
tions whilst in the hypnotic state) can be used as 
a measure of the level of hypnotic susceptibility or 
hypnotizability defined as “maximum depth that 
can be achieved under the most favourable con-
ditions” (Orne & O’Connell, 1967, p.126).  Thus, 
for example, Tart (1966) remarks, “The total re-
sponsiveness of a subject to hypnotic test items is 
conventionally used as a measure of trance depth 
or profundity” (p.  380).  Indeed, this provided 
the rationale behind the early ‘hypnotic suscep-
tibility’ scales which were often also referred 
to as measures of ‘hypnotizability’ (see, for ex-
ample, Barry, Mackinnon & Murray, 1931; Davis 
& Husband, 1931; Friedlander & Sarbin, 1938; 
Orne & O’Connell, 1967; Sheehan & McConkey, 
1986).  Thus, for example, Barry et al. (1931) state, 
“Hypnosis it is conceded may vary as to depth but 
there is no agreement as to the number or char-
acter of the stages (degrees of depth) . . . With the 
intention of finding and settling upon a pragmati-
cally suitable formula we selected suggestibility 
and amnesia and adopted the following formula 
for scoring: . . .” (p. 9)
However, within this context, another ap-
proach to measuring depth was to assume that, 
in addition to, or even in the absence of, effects 
on suggestions, the hypnotic state gives rise to 
other profound changes in phenomenological ex-
perience that can be indexed through self-report 
depth scales (Tart, 1966; 1970; 1979).  Thus Tart 
and Hilgard (1966) also argued that: “The subject’s 
report that he feels hypnotized to some degree is 
primary data about the presence or absence of 
hypnosis, if not a criterion of hypnosis” (p. 108).  
As originally conceived, therefore, the dis-
tinction between hypnotic depth reports and re-
sponsiveness to hypnotic suggestions concerned 
a distinction between two ways of measuring the 
same thing, hypnotic susceptibility or hypnotiz-
ability, which was conceptualised as the capacity 
to enter the hypnotic state, or “maximum depth 
that can be achieved under the most favourable 
conditions” (Orne & O’Connell, 1967, p.126; see 
also, Bowers, 1983; Tart, 1966).  And, significantly, 
it was against this background that Weitzenhoffer 
(1980) originally made his criticisms of the 
standard suggestion based scales; i.e. by relying 
entirely on suggestions, they confounded the 
measurement of true ‘hypnotic susceptibility’ (ca-
pacity to enter the hypnotic state), with suggest-
ibility per se (see also, Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; 
Kirsch & Braffman, 1999; Wagstaff et al., 2008). 
It can be also noted here that, with the abandon-
ment in the modern literature of the distinction 
between ‘hypnotic suggestibility’ and ‘hypnotic 
susceptibility’ under the all embracing term ‘hyp-
notizability’, these semantic and conceptual dis-
tinctions seem to have been lost or blurred.
Reconciling etymology and 
scientific theory in the defi-
nition of hypnosis
If we accept the basic premise that, in principle, 
a definition of hypnosis does not actually have to 
reflect modern scientific opinion and practice, 
then we could finish the discussion here.  We 
could just define hypnosis in terms of its etymo-
logical origins as some kind of  ‘altered state of 
consciousness’, as in most dictionary definitions , 
and then say that  hypnotizability is then the ca-
pacity to enter this altered state, a hypnotic induc-
tion is a procedure designed to produce this state, 
and so on.  And if people want to reject the idea of 
hypnosis as an altered state for whatever reason, 
then all they need to argue is that ‘ hypnosis does 
not exist’.  However, if we could come up with 
definitions of hypnosis and related terminology 
that are more consistent with their etymological 
origins, yet can at least accommodate some varia-
tions in modern scientific opinion, this would 
seem preferable.  What follows, therefore, is an 
attempt to show how this might be achieved with 
two different approaches to the conceptualisation 
of  hypnosis, the first more consistent with the 
idea of hypnosis as a trance, or altered state, the 
second leaning more towards what is now known 
as the sociocognitive position on hypnosis, which 
tends to reject, or at least place less emphasis on, 
the concept of a hypnotic altered state as a useful 
way of describing or explaining the behaviours 
we associate with hypnosis (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995). 
As, Kirsch and Lynn emphasize, it is important 
not to polarize these positions, but, nevertheless, 
it might be worth considering whether it is pos-
sible to come up with definitions of hypnosis and 
terminology that can accommodate, at least to 
some extent, various shades of opinion with re-
gard to these theoretical viewpoints, whilst still 
maintaining a reasonable connection with the 
etymological roots of the term ‘hypnosis’.  
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Measuring hypnotizability
As a starting point, let us revisit the idea that 
hypnotic ‘depth reports’ (after induction) and 
‘responses to hypnotic suggestions’ (i.e. after in-
duction) can both be used as measures or  indica-
tors of the construct of ‘hypnotic susceptibility’or 
‘hypnotizability’ (Bowers, 1983).  If this is the case, 
we would expect them to be related empirically. 
Is this so? 
A variety of evidence indicates that simple 
Likert style self-reported hypnotic depth reports 
are psychometrically highly reliable, and corre-
late highly and significantly with other standard 
suggestion based measures which purport to 
measure  hypnotizability or hypnotic susceptibil-
ity, even if measured before the administration of 
any other suggestions (Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Tart, 
1970, 1979; Wagstaff et al., 2008).  Moreover, depth 
reports have been shown to equal or outperform 
more standard suggestion based measures in 
some areas, including predicting profound hyp-
notic responses such as amnesia (Wagstaff et al., 
2008; Wagstaff, Parkes & Hanley, 2001).  For ex-
ample, Wagstaff et al. (2008), found that SSHS:A 
amnesia scores showed a  higher correlation with 
hypnotic depth reports (r = −.59), than with  sug-
gestions on the rest of the scale (r = −.39).  In fact, 
when these correlations were entered as predic-
tors in a linear regression model with amnesia 
scores as the dependent variable, only depth re-
ports emerged as a significant predictor.  This 
may be significant, as amnesia has been described 
as “among the most striking and important phe-
nomena of hypnosis” (Nace, Orne, & Hammer, 
1974, p.257), and many writers have argued that 
suggested amnesia is a fundamental criterion for 
the classification of ‘deep hypnosis’ (Barber, 1999; 
Wagstaff et al., 2008).
Interestingly, however, the standard Likert 
style depth scales most commonly used in the lit-
erature provide little if any information to subjects 
as to how to rate themselves.  For example, here 
are the instructions for one of the most popular of 
these scales, the Long Stanford Scale of Hypnotic 
Depth (see, Tart, 1970; Wagstaff et al., 2008).
During your experience of hypnosis I will be 
interested in knowing just how hypnotized you 
are.  You will be able to tell me this by calling out a 
number from zero to ten, depending on how hyp-
notized you feel yourself to be.  Zero will mean 
that you are awake and alert, as you normally are. 
One will mean a kind of borderline state, between 
sleeping and waking.  Two will mean that you are 
lightly hypnotized.  If you call out the number five 
it will mean that you feel quite strongly and deep-
ly hypnotized.  If you feel really very hypnotized, 
you would call out the number eight or nine.  Ten 
will mean that you are very deeply hypnotized, 
and can do just about anything I suggest to you.*
So, if it is indeed the case that depth reports, 
like hypnotic suggestions (or even more than 
hypnotic suggestions), index the ability to enter 
a ‘hypnotic state’, what exactly is this, and how do 
subjects know they are in it, when  given so little 
information to go on?  
The generic trance  
hypothesis
In everyday practice, many clinicians and re-
searchers consider it appropriate and useful to use 
the terms ‘hypnotic trance’ and ‘hypnotic state’ to 
refer to more or less any condition of absorbed 
attention.  So, for example, a person in a profound 
state of relaxation, concentration or meditation, 
could be described as ‘in trance’, and, thereby, 
‘hypnotized’.  And, indeed, many researchers 
have noted similarities between effects produced 
by standard hypnotic induction procedures and 
other procedures such as systematic relaxation, 
autogenic training and meditation.  For example, 
Edmonston (1977) has proposed that “neutral 
hypnosis= relaxation” (p.  689); that is, hypnosis 
as induced by an induction procedure, but with-
out any other suggestions, is basically relaxation. 
Typically, it has been argued that these proce-
dures and conditions share a number of common 
features including the adoption of a relaxed, pas-
sive mode of thinking which is brought about by 
focusing of attention on some neutral target or 
set of targets such as parts of the body or breath-
ing, whilst ignoring distracting thoughts (Barber, 
Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Benson & Klipper, 1976; 
Edmonston, 1977, 1991; Morse, Martin, Furst & 
Dubin, 1977).  Often researchers and practitio-
ners also liken the hypnotic ‘state’ to everyday ex-
periences, such as, being ‘lost in thought’ or day 
dreaming, absorption in sport, reading, listening 
to music etc., and driving for long distances and 
not recalling the route taken (see, for example, 
Hypnosis Unit UK, 2012; Whalley, 2012).  Others 
have also extended the idea of a hypnotic trance 
to cover a range of pathological dissociative dis-
orders, pointing to studies showing that respons-
es to suggestions following hypnotic induction 
procedures can sometimes higher in individuals 
who are diagnosed with this kind of pathology 
(for discussions of related issues see, for example, 
Bryant Guthrie & Moulds, 2001; Dienes, 2009; 
Spiegel, Hunt & Dondershine, 1988).   
For descriptive purposes, we could call this 
the ‘generic trance’ hypothesis; that is, the view 
that hypnosis belongs to, or is akin to, a family of 
‘trance experiences’ frequently found in everyday 
life.  In modern times this conception of hypnosis 
seems to have received considerable popular sup-
port.  For example, in the influential BPS report 
on the Nature of Hypnosis it states: “the concept 
of ‘trance’ may be a useful term to denote the 
 
* The phrase, ‘Ten will mean 
that you are very deeply 
hypnotized, and can do just 
about anything I suggest to 
you’ could be construed as 
inflating correlations with 
suggestions by influencing 
expectancy; however, even 
this detail does not appear to 
be necessary; depth reports 
still correlate highly and sig-
nificantly with responses to 
other suggestions even when 
such descriptors are absent 
(Hilgard & Tart, 1966).
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state of inner absorption and detachment from 
immediate realities that is usually encouraged by 
the hypnotic induction and often reported by the 
subject.  In this sense it may be very similar to 
everyday ‘trance’ experiences, for example, when 
one is absorbed in some music or a daydream, or 
engrossed in a book.” (p. 6)  Moreover, a variety 
of evidence could be construed as supporting a 
fairly generic conceptualisation of ‘trance’.  For 
example, when Edmonston (1977, 1991) asked 
highly hypnotizable subjects what the hypnotic 
state is like, what is unique about hypnosis, and 
how they judge themselves to be hypnotized, the 
overwhelming majority mentioned feelings of 
relaxation and feeling calm and peaceful.  Also, 
other researchers have found that reports of the 
experience of hypnosis from hypnotizable indi-
viduals tend to be indistinguishable from those 
given by participants who have undergone relax-
ation training, or instructions in the use of imag-
ery (Barber, 1969; Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; 
Edmonston, 1977; Kirsch, Mobayed, Council & 
Kenny, 1992; Lynn, Myer & Mackillop, 2000). 
Another very important feature of viewing the 
hypnotic state in this way, is it allows the hypnotic 
state, and variations of consciousness associated 
with it, to occur spontaneously, which some have 
argued is an important feature of the hypnosis 
(Pekala & Kumar, 1997; Cardeña, 2005).  Indeed, 
many people have argued that people may ‘slip 
into’ hypnosis in a variety of everyday situations 
and in some pathological conditions (Beahrs, 
1989; Spiegel & Greenleaf, 2006).  Hence, one can 
see here why some researchers and theorists have 
rejected the idea of defining ‘hypnosis’ operation-
ally, as simply what occurs as a response to, or af-
ter, an induction procedure, as according to this 
view of the hypnotic trance, a person may ‘drift 
into hypnosis’ without a formal induction pro-
cedure (Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Sheehan & Perry, 
1976; Green et al., 2005).
However, there are also a number of well 
known difficulties with this ‘generic trance’ hy-
pothesis.  For example, in contexts explicitly de-
fined as ‘hypnosis’, participants still report them-
selves as hypnotized and show elevated responses 
to suggestions when instructions are given that 
appear to directly counter experiences of relax-
ation and calmness, or being lost in thought and 
daydreaming; for example, by increasing physi-
ological arousal and encouraging them to be alert 
and attentive (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Barber, 
1969; Cardeña et al., 1998; Cikurel & Gruzelier, 
1990; Malott, 1984; Gill & Brenman, 1959).  Also, 
writers disagree on the phenomena that are to be 
included in this generalised or ‘generic trance’ 
concept.  For instance, whilst some have argued 
that meditation can be included or integrated 
with the hypnotic domain (Benson & Klipper, 
1976; Williams, Hallquist, Barnes, Cole & Lynn, 
2010), others have argued that meditation and 
hypnosis produce very different cognitive and 
physiological effects (see, for example, Semmens-
Wheeler & Dienes, 2012).  
Another potential problem with the generic 
trance hypothesis is that the concept of a ‘hyp-
notic trance’ as something similar to everyday 
experiences could be considered rather differ-
ent from the more traditional conception of a 
hypnotic trance or hypnosis as an altered state 
of consciousness (ASC), as conceptualised else-
where in the literature (Barber, 1969; Wagstaff et 
al., 1981, 1998; see also Cardeña, 2011, and Kallio 
& Revonsuo, 2003, for discussions  of related is-
sues).  For instance, Tart (1972) defines an ASC 
as a "qualitative alteration in the overall pattern 
of mental functioning, such that the experiencer 
feels his consciousness is radically different from 
the way it functions ordinarily" (p. 1203, my em-
phasis).  Similarly, Farthing (1992) defines an 
ASC as a "temporary change in the overall pattern 
of subjective experience, such that the individual 
believes that his or her mental functioning is dis-
tinctly different" (p. 205, my emphasis).  Arguably, 
such definitions of an ASC perhaps imply a per-
ceived shift in mental functioning rather more 
extreme than, say, when one is say, engrossed in 
music, a book or sport.  Also, as Hoffman (1988) 
points out, “Trance is still conventionally defined 
as a state of reduced consciousness, or a somno-
lent state” (p.  9).  And, indeed, the traditional 
view of the hypnotic trance, as expressed not only 
in the historical literature, but also in much of the 
experimental literature, has often implied the ex-
istence of an ASC that seems somewhat different 
from that associated with involvement in a range 
of everyday activities; for example, its manifesta-
tions include a profound loss of, or decrease in, 
the experience of volition, increased suggestibility, 
amnesia, and a capacity  to experience delusions, 
hallucinations and anaesthesia, to a degree not 
found in the ‘waking state’ (Barber, 1969; Barber, 
Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Bowers, 1983; Hilgard 
1965; Wagstaff, 1981; Spanos, 1982, 1986; Spanos & 
Chaves, 1989). 
It appears, therefore, that there may be a po-
tential tension or mismatch here between the idea 
that hypnosis is a ‘trance state’ akin to everyday 
experiences, and the view that there is something 
about the hypnotic state that enables us to have 
experiences that are qualitatively very different 
from those commonly encountered in everyday 
activities (see Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003, for an ex-
plication of this view).  So, if hypnosis is indeed 
related to a variety of everyday experiences, it 
looks like we may need to ‘add’ something that 
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will transform these everyday experiences into 
the hypnotic altered state.  So the question be-
comes; what do we need to add? 
One possible answer may emerge if we ad-
dress what is perhaps the major problem with the 
‘generic trance’ hypothesis.  That is, as yet, there 
seems to be no definitive empirical evidence that 
relaxation, meditation, absorption etc., of them-
selves, increase suggestibility.  As mentioned 
previously, it has long been argued that it is the 
increase in suggestibility that most reliably dif-
ferentiates ‘hypnotic’ behaviour from normal 
‘waking behaviour’ (Bernheim, 1889; Bowers, 
1983; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Hull, 1933; Kirsch & 
Braffman, 1999).  But it seems that suggestibility 
is only increased significantly if the ‘trance in-
ducing procedure’ is actually labelled or contex-
tualised as ‘hypnosis’.  For example, Gandhi and 
Oakley (2005) gave participants identical relax-
ation/induction procedures; however, for one 
group the procedure was labelled as ‘hypnosis’ 
and the other ‘relaxation’.  Their results showed 
significant increases in suggestibility (responses 
to suggestions) on behavioural and experiential 
measures, and also perceptions of involuntari-
ness, only when the relaxation induction was la-
belled as ‘hypnosis’.  Hence they conclude, “these 
results indicate that the significant effects that 
hypnotic inductions have on suggestibility is de-
pendent on the label hypnosis” (p. 311).  The pres-
ent author has found effects consistent with these 
in an analysis of hypnotic depth reports using the 
Long Stanford Scale of Hypnotic Depth described 
earlier.  Thus participants (N = 21) assigned to a 
condition in which they received a meditation fo-
cused breathing procedure introduced as a ‘sim-
ple focussed breathing exercise’, with no men-
tion at any stage of hypnosis, were no more likely 
to rate themselves as hypnotized than controls 
(N = 20) receiving no meditation procedure (for 
details of the meditation exercise see, Wagstaff et 
al., 2004).  However, participants (N = 20) receiv-
ing the same meditation exercise, but introduced 
as ‘a very simple hypnotic induction procedure’ 
were significantly more likely to rate themselves 
as ‘hypnotized’.  The median LSS scores were 0, 
0, and 3, for the three conditions, respectively, 
Kruskall Wallis χ²(2)  =  28.96, p  <  .0001.  The 
median score of 3 for the hypnosis label group 
compares favourably with the normative median 
score of 2 (indicating ‘lightly hypnotized’) expect-
ed with the use of a standard induction procedure 
labelled as hypnosis (see LSS norms, Wagstaff et 
al., 2008).  Moreover, only those in the hypno-
sis label condition achieved scores in the 6−−8 
range, indicating that they felt ‘very’ or ‘deeply’ 
hypnotized.  There is also some evidence to sug-
gest that the label of hypnosis may have a crucial 
influence on any additional benefits that may ac-
crue from the addition of hypnotic procedures to 
therapeutic procedures (Kirsch, Montgomery & 
Sapirstein, 1995).   
The relationship between 
trance and suggestibility 
In sum, there appears to be no definitive evidence 
that procedures involving relaxation, meditation, 
absorption etc., of themselves, raise suggestibility. 
Rather, it seems that  any increases in suggest-
ibility that arise from the use of hypnotic induc-
tion procedures only occur when the context is 
interpreted by the subject as one of ‘hypnosis’.  If 
this is actually the case, then  perhaps we have a 
candidate for what it is that  transforms the every-
day experiences and sensations that have at one 
time or another been placed within the domain of 
‘generic trance’, into the kinds of experiences and 
sensations more often associated with hypnosis. 
It is the definition of the context as one of hypno-
sis; that is, a suggestion to the hypnotic subject that 
he or she is entering an altered state of conscious-
ness we call ‘hypnosis’ (Wagstaff, 1998).  
Significantly, this is consistent with the 
view that the primary, or necessary, mechanism 
through which suggestion is raised by hypnotic 
inductions is, as Liébeault (1886) and Bernheim 
(1889) argued, suggestion itself; that is, the label 
of hypnosis acts as an extra suggestion that the 
subject is entering an ‘altered state’ or ‘trance’ that 
will (usually) increase responses to other sugges-
tions and lead to experiences associated with such 
a state (see also, Wagstaff, 1981, 1998; 2004; 2010; 
Wagstaff et al., 2008).  Thus Bernheim (1889) var-
iously argued, “The (hypnotic) sleep itself is the 
effect of a suggestion . . .” (p. viii), and hence, “It 
is suggestion that rules hypnotism” (p. 15).  But, 
as a corollary, in Bernheim’s view, the hypnotic 
condition cannot occur spontaneously; rather he 
says: “The idea of being hypnotized must be pres-
ent . . .’ (p. 5).*
The idea that the mechanism through which 
hypnotic induction raises suggestibility is sug-
gestion itself, i.e. the suggestion for hypnosis, may 
also help to illuminate why, perhaps surprising-
ly, depth reports are such reliable predictors of 
scores on suggestion based ‘hypnotizability’ mea-
sures (Bowers, 1983; Tart, 1970, 1979; Wagstaff  et 
al., 2008).  Perhaps the reason why depth reports 
correlate so well with other suggestion based 
measures of hypnotizability is that they reflect 
the subject’s acceptance of the suggestion that 
hypnosis has occurred (Wagstaff et al., 2008); i.e. 
depth reports are perhaps the most direct mea-
sure available of subjects’ acceptance of the ‘sug-
gestion for hypnosis’ (i.e. the suggestion that they 
are entering an altered state in which they will 
 
*According to the viewpoint 
expressed here, it is not 
necessary to use the word 
‘hypnosis’ as part of an in-
duction routine, for subjects 
to accept the suggestion 
for hypnosis, or define the 
context as one of hypnosis. 
The only requirement is 
that the subject is prepared 
to construe the situation in 
this way. A subject could, in 
theory, construe any situa-
tion, even without a formal 
induction, as one of hypno-
sis, if it accords with his/her 
conception of what hypnosis 
is like or involves.
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be more responsive to suggestions, have unusual 
experiences etc.).  Put another way, they measure 
what could be construed as the first suggestion on 
the suggestion based standard scales of hypnotiz-
ability: the suggestion conveyed by the induction 
procedure (Wagstaff, 1998, 2010).  
Are ‘generic trance’ experi-
ences an irrelevance?
But, if so, does this mean that, in terms of explain-
ing hypnotic behaviours and depth ratings, the 
sorts of everyday experiences that have been in-
terpreted by some researchers as lying within the 
domain of ‘generic trance’ experiences are actu-
ally an irrelevance? Possibly related here are some 
early findings from Barber and his colleagues in-
vestigating the effects of sleep/relaxation instruc-
tions and labelling the context of hypnosis on 
suggestibility (Barber & Calverley, 1964; 1965ab; 
Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; see also, Mazzoni 
et al., 2013; Wagstaff, 2010).  
In a series of studies, Barber and Calverley 
(1964, 1965ab) found that suggestions for sleep 
and relaxation did not significantly affect suggest-
ibility if subjects were led to believe that the pro-
cedure would be ineffective in inducing hypnosis. 
However, labelling the situation as ‘hypnosis’, but 
with no sleep or relaxation instructions, resulted 
in a small but significant increase on suggest-
ibility.  But, most significantly, suggestibility was 
increased further when suggestions for sleep and 
relaxation were added to the label of hypnosis. 
Along with the findings of Gandhi and Oakley 
(2005), these findings of Barber and Calverley 
appear to indicate that, although instructions for 
sleep and relaxation alone may not increase sug-
gestibility, they may significantly influence the ef-
fectiveness of the label of hypnosis in increasing 
responsiveness to suggestions.  
This endorses the view of Barber, Spanos and 
Chaves (1974) that suggestions for eye fixation, 
relaxation etc. do not act directly to create hyp-
notic phenomena, but rather they may act indi-
rectly to reinforce the attribution that ‘hypnosis’ 
has occurred and thereby increase the readiness 
to respond to suggestions.  Hence, Barber and 
Calverley (1965b) state that, “The administra-
tion of relaxation-sleep suggestions, therefore, 
serves to emphasize (to subjects) that the situa-
tion is ‘hypnosis’ in which high response to test-
suggestions is not only easy but is also desired and 
expected” (p.  263).  Barber, Spanos and Chaves 
(1974) also state:
If a subject responds to the relaxation-sleep-
hypnosis suggestions or to some of the other 
variables involved in induction procedures and, 
consequently, experiences changes in body feel-
ings and judges from his responses that he is 
hypnotized, his expectancy that he can be af-
fected by suggestions is enhanced.  His enhanced 
expectancy, in turn, tends to heighten his respon-
siveness to subsequent test suggestions.  (p. 45)
The idea that subjects may use a range of 
non-specific subjective experiences to support 
their attributions of being hypnotized, and raise 
suggestibility, has also been suggested by a num-
ber of other researchers and writers (see for ex-
ample, Kidder, 1973; Hilgard; 1986; Mazzoni et al., 
2013; Skemp, 1972; Wagstaff, 1981, 1998, 2010). For 
example, Mazzoni et al., (2013) have drawn atten-
tion to the following quote from Hilgard (1986): 
After a subject has agreed to participate in 
hypnosis and has been hypnotized according 
to any of the several methods, he perceives that 
some changes have taken place, partly as a re-
sponse to the suggestions that have been given in 
the induction, such as relaxation of his muscles, 
drowsiness, and other subtle changes that are part 
of the total experience for him.  This feeling of 
being hypnotized, being in some kind of changed 
condition or state, makes him ready to accept the 
suggestions of the hypnotist to produce the spe-
cific responses that are called for.  (p. 163)
However, another way that the experiences 
associated with the induction procedures may 
facilitate responsiveness to suggestions, is the 
subject may utilise them to perform suggestions. 
For example, a number of researchers have ar-
gued that one of the ways in which subjects may 
come to experience suggestion effects is through 
redirected attention or inattention; in particular, 
this may help to facilitate attributions of involun-
tariness (Crawford & Gruzelier; 1992; Egner & 
Raz, 2007; Spanos, 1982; Wagstaff, 2004; Wegner 
& Erskine, 2003).  Consequently, having received 
the ‘suggestion for hypnosis’, subjects may then 
be able to use any redirected focus (on breath-
ing, feelings of sleep/relaxation, absorption etc.) 
to enhance responses to suggestion (see also, 
Kidder, 1973; Skemp, 1972).
Thus, from the ‘hypnosis as a suggestion’ 
perspective, the kinds of processes and experi-
ences that, at one time or another,  proponents 
of the ‘generic trance’ hypothesis have related to 
hypnosis are not necessarily epiphenomena, in 
the sense of being an irrelevance to response to 
suggestions; rather they may act together with the 
suggestion for ‘hypnosis’ to provide a source of 
experiences that a) justify the attribution that an 
‘altered state’ has occurred, thus raising motiva-
tion and expectancies, and b) facilitate a redirec-
tion of focus that may aid the strategic enactment 
of some suggestions.  Moreover, in principle, any 
procedure which results in some kind of experi-
ential change in a particular context is potentially 
capable of providing experiences that can be used 
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in this way, including procedures which encour-
age alertness and arousal (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; 
Cardeña et al., 1998; Cikurel & Gruzelier, 1990; 
Ludwig, 1966; Malott, 1984).  The idea that sub-
jects may use external cues to label their experi-
ences of a variety of ambiguous internal cues is 
well known in the social psychological literature 
(see, for example, Dutton & Aron, 1974; Schachter 
& Singer, 1962; Valins & Ray, 1967; Wagstaff, 1981).
This creates a rather different model of hyp-
nosis to one which construes hypnosis as a trance 
state which is associated with increases in re-
sponsiveness to suggestion, but is independent in 
kind from suggestion.  In this alternative model, 
hypnosis now associated with a particular ‘spe-
cies’ or subcategory of suggestion (the suggestion 
that one is in an altered state), which may act on 
other forms of suggestion.  Nevertheless, within 
this framework, a variety of what could be termed 
non-specific processes and experiences may still 
be used by the hypnotic subject to support or 
reinforce the commitment that hypnosis has oc-
curred (Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Wagstaff, 
1981, 1986, 2010; Mazzoni et al., 2013).  It should 
also be emphasized, however, that this is very dif-
ferent from simply equating hypnosis with sug-
gestion; it would obviously be a logical fallacy to 
argue that because hypnosis is itself the result of a 
suggestion, then any suggestion must be hypnosis 
(this is like saying, Tom Jones is a singer, there-
fore, any singer must be Tom Jones).
The contents of ‘generic 
trance’ reconsidered
If we adopt this viewpoint, it may help to explain 
some of the inconsistencies in views and findings 
with regard to what should be included within the 
category of ‘generic trance’.  For example, to reit-
erate, some have variously argued that hypnosis, 
meditation and relaxation share similar charac-
teristics (Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Benson 
& Klipper, 1976; Edmonston, 1977; Williams et 
al., 2010).  And, indeed, when asked to report 
what an induction felt like, hypnotic subjects 
given standard relaxation induction procedures 
report experiences very similar to subjects who 
have simply undergone relaxation (Barber, 1969; 
Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Edmonston, 
1977).  In contrast, other results suggest that relax-
ation is dissimilar to hypnosis, because it does not 
increase responses to suggestions, and produces 
different physiological effects from hypnosis 
(Gandhi & Oakley, 2005; Williams & Gruzelier, 
2001).  Moreover, hypnotic induction procedures 
produce effects different from those of medita-
tion (Semmes-Wheeler & Deines, 2012).  But 
yet again, other findings suggest that relaxation 
instructions can increase suggestibility (Barber, 
Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Gandhi & Oakley, 2005) 
and meditation instructions can increase depth 
reports (as in the data reported in the present pa-
per), if the context is labelled as ‘hypnosis’.  
Such apparently inconsistent findings might 
make more sense if, again, one were to argue that 
the suggestion conveyed by labelling or defin-
ing the situation as hypnosis, may lead subjects 
to define any perceived shifts in experience, or 
changes in the  background state of conscious-
ness*, resulting from instructions for relaxation, 
alertness etc., as evidence they have been ‘hypno-
tized’.   This in turn could affect a host of variables 
that might facilitate responses to suggestions 
(motivation, expectancies, attention deployment 
etc.).  However, it would not necessarily follow 
from this that all inductions will necessarily pro-
duce the same effects; for example, it is possible 
that different kinds of induction might produce 
different degrees of shifts in experience, or back-
ground state.  It is also well known that the effec-
tiveness of inductions can be substantively, and 
sometimes dramatically, affected by contextual 
and attitudinal variables (Barber, 1969; Silva & 
Kirsch, 1987; Spanos, 1986).  Though, in general, 
unless attempts are made to manipulate attitudes 
and expectancies, there appears to be little reli-
able evidence that the form of the induction has 
any substantive effect on suggestibility (Banyai & 
Hilgard, 1976; Mathews, Lynn & Mosher, 1985).†
From this viewpoint, therefore, it may indeed 
be correct to say that ‘hypnosis’ is not the same 
as relaxation, and not the same as meditation, 
because, for subjects to define their experiences 
as hypnosis, and/or utilize the induction proce-
dures to facilitate their responses to suggestions, 
whatever instructions they have been given must 
be contextualised as hypnosis; i.e. they have to 
accept that they have been ‘hypnotized’, accord-
ing to their view of what this means (Wagstaff, 
1998).  As a result, as the evidence suggests, relax-
ation + the label of (suggestion for) hypnosis will 
tend to produce responses and effects different 
from relaxation alone (Gandhi & Oakley, 2005), 
meditation +  the label of hypnosis will produce 
responses different from meditation alone (as in 
the study on depth reports reported in this pa-
per), relaxation + the label of hypnosis will pro-
duce different responses from meditation without 
the hypnosis label (Semmens-Wheeler & Deines, 
2012).  Moreover, one possible implication of this 
is that if, in an attempt to find some defining core 
feature of hypnosis, we systematically apply the 
‘label/suggestion of hypnosis + x,  versus  x or y or 
z’ paradigm to every conceivable factor that could 
be conceptualised as belonging to the domain 
of  a hypnotic ‘generic trance’, we run the risk of 
eventually eliminating all of them on the grounds 
 
* A background state of 
consciousness refers to the 
idea that, although the more 
fine grained contents of 
consciousness may change 
continually, they are set 
against a general back-
ground state, such as being 
awake, being asleep, and 
dreaming (Chalmers, 2010). 
If we argue that any change 
in the background state 
of consciousness, in any 
direction, could potentially 
reinforce the subject’s view 
that he/she is ‘hypnotized’, 
we have a possible mecha-
nism for understanding  
why, when combined with 
the suggestion for hypnosis, 
both alerting and relaxation 
inductions increase sug-
gestibility (see also, Kallio & 
Revonsuo, 2003).
 
† One apparent excep-
tion here is a study by 
Brown, Antonova, Langley, 
& Oakley (2001), which 
demonstrated that induc-
tions supplemented by using 
suggestions for absorption 
and reduced critical thought 
were more effective than 
relaxation alone in increas-
ing responses to suggestion 
(though not significantly 
different from each other); 
indeed the relaxation induc-
tion produced a decrease 
in suggestibility. For some 
reason this result was clearly 
anomalous. Virtually all of 
the major hypnosis scales, 
and many hypnotherapeutic 
techniques use induc-
tion procedures based on 
suggestions for sleep and 
relaxation; and the literature 
is replete with studies show-
ing that such relaxation 
type inductions significantly 
raise suggestibility, and 
levels of reported hypnotic 
depth (e.g. Barber, 1969; 
Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 
1974; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; 
Gibbons & Lynn, 2010). 
Relaxation based procedures 
are also routinely used by 
neuroimaging researchers to 
evoke hypnotic effects (see 
for example, McGeown , 
Mazzoni, Venneri  & Kirsch, 
2009;  Rainville et al, 1999).
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that none produces the same effects as ‘hypnosis’.*
So, despite decades of research devoted, as yet 
unsuccessfully, to finding some core defining psy-
chological or physiological feature we can associ-
ate with the hypnotic state, we may have missing 
something very obvious.  There is actually some-
thing common to the vast majority of procedures 
we label ‘hypnotic induction procedures’, that is in 
many respects unique, and seems very much re-
lated to the kinds of changes in suggestibility and 
experience we might expect of someone in a hyp-
notic state: they all explicitly or implicitly convey to 
the subject that idea that the procedure will induce 
a state of ‘hypnosis’, with all the associations and 
expectancies that this idea carries.  A relaxation 
procedure without the label of hypnosis is just 
that: a relaxation procedure.  Tell, or imply to, the 
subject that it is a hypnosis procedure, and it is 
transformed into something rather different and 
rather special: a hypnotic induction procedure.  
And if we accept this conceptualisation, then 
perhaps it is not surprising that manipulating 
subjects’ expectancies and beliefs as to whether 
hypnosis is present, and what hypnosis is likely 
to do, appears to have considerably more effect 
on responses to suggestions following induction, 
than changing the mechanics of the induction 
procedure (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Barber, 1969; 
Mathews, Kirsch & Mosher, 1985; Silva & Kirsch, 
1987; Spanos, 1986; Spanos, Cobb & Gorassini, 
1985).  Hence, if there really is some entity or 
emergent property we can meaningfully describe 
as a ‘hypnotic altered state of consciousness’, that 
is perhaps accompanied or identifiable by a set 
of discrete psychological or physiological mark-
ers, we are unlikely to find it whilst ignoring or 
rejecting what might be its most critical feature, 
defining the context as hypnosis, or conveying the 
suggestion for hypnosis.  
Definitions of hypnosis revis-
ited
Which of the two models identified in this paper, 
i.e. hypnosis as an altered state that can exist inde-
pendent of suggestion, or hypnosis is the accep-
tance of a suggestion that one is in such a state, 
clearly remains a point of contention, and it is not 
within the scope of the present paper to debate 
further their relative merits.  Instead, the main 
point here is to emphasize that, although these 
models might appear to represent very different 
theoretical approaches to the study of hypnosis, 
they both use the idea of hypnosis as an altered 
state as a central or core concept in defining the 
concept of hypnosis.  In other words, in essence, 
‘hypnosis’ is either an altered state that exists in-
dependently of suggestion, or it involves accep-
tance of a suggestion for one.  What hypnosis is 
not, however, is simply ‘suggestion’, or ‘response 
to suggestion’, or ‘giving suggestions’.
Because the concept of an altered state is cen-
tral to both viewpoints, we now perhaps have the 
opportunity to come up with some definitions 
that can accommodate both, and also fit more 
closely with the etymological origins of the terms. 
So, here are some possibilities.  It can be noted 
that, apart from the fact there is no reference to 
sleep or somnambulism, all could be considered 
reasonably consistent with the etymological ori-
gins of the terms. 
Hypnosis (in essence): Hypnosis can be 
defined as 1)  an alleged altered state of 
consciousness normally associated with 
increased susceptibility to suggestion, 
and changes in sensations, perceptions, 
thoughts, and  behaviour, or  2) accep-
tance of the suggestion that one is in such 
a condition.
By referring to an alleged altered of conscious-
ness, like the APA and BPS definitions, the defini-
tion aims to remain relatively non-committal as 
to the actual existence of such an altered state, or 
whether it is useful to postulate the existence of 
one.  By using the term ‘normally’, it also allows 
for the position that a person who is hypnotized 
may not necessarily show an increase in response 
to suggestion, as occasionally a minority of sub-
jects will show a decrease in suggestibility after 
induction (Hilgard & Tart, 1966), and hypnotized 
subjects may resist responding to suggestions, if 
instructions imply that such resistance is concor-
dant with deep hypnosis (Silva & Kirsch, 1987; 
Spanos, Cobb & Gorassini, 1985).  Also, it does not 
assume that any relationship between the altered 
state of consciousness and suggestibility is causal 
(see, for example, Hilgard, 1969; Kihlstrom, 1985). 
The phrase ‘changes in sensations, perceptions, 
thoughts, and behaviour’ is borrowed directly 
from the definition in the APA website (American 
Psychological Association, 2012).
 
Hypnotic induction procedure: a proce-
dure designed to induce or bring about 
hypnosis (as defined above).  
This definition can accommodate a variety of 
hypnotic induction procedures, including alert-
ing instructions, or relaxation/sleep style proce-
dures, leading to ‘alert’ vs ‘non-alert/relaxation’ 
types of hypnosis (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Barber, 
1969; Cardeña et al., 1998; Cikurel & Gruzelier, 
1990; Gibbons & Lynn, 2010; Malott, 1984).  
 
*It can be noted that there 
are two ways this paradigm 
is popularly applied. The 
first is to use a standard two 
or more conditions design, 
suggestion for hypnosis label 
+x versus x. The second is to 
use a high vs low hypnotiz-
ability conditions paradigm 
where all are given the 
hypnotic induction, and 
comparisons are made 
between high hypnotizables 
and low hypnotizables (see, 
for example, Williams & 
Gruzelier, 2001). However, if 
we assume that highs accept 
the suggestion for hypnosis, 
and lows do not, the design 
is equivalent.
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Hypnotism (or hypnosis as a procedure): 
the art or practice of inducing and using 
hypnosis.   
As construed here, hypnotism or ‘hypnosis 
as a procedure’, typically involves administering 
suggestions in a context that utilises a hypnotic 
induction procedure, as defined above.  It can be 
noted that it is here that procedural descriptions 
of hypnosis, such as those given in the definitions 
provided by the APA and BPS, can come into 
their own.
Hypnotizability / hypnotic susceptibility: 
the ability to enter hypnosis (as previ-
ously defined), or respond to a suggestion 
for hypnosis.   
Hypnotizability as defined here is not the 
same as ‘response to suggestion’, or ‘response to 
suggestion after induction’, and thus does not suf-
fer their attendant problems (Braffman & Kirsch, 
1999; Kirsch & Braffman, 1999; Wagstaff et al., 
2008; Weitzenhoffer, 1980, 2002).  However, the 
issue arises as to how best to measure it.  
Ideally, if there actually existed an entity we 
could reasonable label a ‘hypnotic altered state’, 
and we could establish a set of discrete physi-
ological markers that could be used to index 
the degree of to which subjects had entered this 
state, we could use these as an index of hypno-
tizability.  However, although a growing volume 
of studies,  especially in the neuropsychological 
literature, have found results consistent with  the 
view that responses to hypnotic suggestions, in-
cluding those for hallucinations and analgesia, 
may be experienced veridically (see, for example, 
Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, Alpert 
& Spiegel, 2000;  Jensen, Barabasz, Barabasz, and 
Warner, 2001; Rainville et al., 1999),  it has yet to 
be established whether such studies can be con-
sidered to attest to the reality of a hypnotic state. 
Moreover, we do not appear to have found a set of 
discrete physiological markers that we can associ-
ate with a hypnotic state (whether construed as 
independent of suggestion, or an emergent prop-
erty resulting from a combination of the sugges-
tion for hypnosis, with ‘generic trance’ processes), 
and of a kind that could be used as an index of 
hypnotizability as construed here (Lynn, Kirsch, 
Knox & Lilienfield, 2006; Mazzoni et al., 2013; 
Oakley & Halligan, 2010).*
In the meantime, therefore, for reasons iden-
tified earlier, perhaps depth reports are the most 
direct way of measuring hypnotizability; howev-
er, given that, after induction, depth reports cor-
relate significantly with responses to imaginative 
suggestions, especially following an induction 
procedure, the latter could also potentially be 
used as an indirect or proxy measure of hypnotiz-
ability (see Box I).
Hypnotic suggestibility: responsiveness to 
suggestions given together with, or in the 
context of, hypnosis and hypnotism as 
previously defined.  
Non-hypnotic (‘waking’) suggestibility: re-
sponsiveness to suggestions given outside 
of the context of hypnosis and hypnotism 
as previously defined.
Significantly, these definitions allow a per-
son to exhibit hypnotic suggestibility without a 
formal induction procedure.  Also, they do not 
assume that a hypnotic induction procedure is 
necessary to produce hypnosis.  This is consistent 
with the view that hypnosis is an altered state that 
can occur spontaneously (Beahrs, 1989; Spiegel 
& Greenleaf, 2006), but is most likely to occur 
 
*As Mazzoni et al. (2013) 
comment, “The designs of 
many neuroimaging studies 
confound the induction 
of hypnosis with the sug-
gestions that can be given 
in or out of hypnosis, thus 
rendering them incapable 
of resolving the controversy. 
Brain imaging studies that 
do not have this confound 
support the hypothesis that 
hypnotic inductions produce 
changes in brain activity, 
but also indicate that these 
changes are not required for 
the experience of hypnotic 
suggestions or their neural 
correlates." (p. 400; See also, 
Wagstaff, 1998, 2004, with 
regard to the interpretation 
of results of physiological 
studies of hypnosis.)
are obviously different constructs 
(one measures the self-perception 
of hypnotic depth, the other imagi-
native suggestibility). Nevertheless, 
they correlate significantly with each 
other, and hence both can potentially 
be used to measure the construct of 
hypnotizability, though with differ-
ent degrees of accuracy.  A possible 
analogy here is the measurement of 
alcohol use using Blood Alcohol lev-
els and impulsivity. Both are known 
to correlate significantly with alco-
hol use, but they are obviously not 
the same thing; one is measuring the 
alcohol level in the blood and the 
other is measuring impulsivity. How-
ever, that does not mean that they 
cannot both be used as measures of 
another construct, alcohol use. The 
main difference is BAL is more of a 
direct measure, whereas impulsivity 
is clearly an indirect or proxy mea-
sure. In fact, if one substitutes BAL 
for hypnotic depth reports, impulsiv-
ity for suggestibility, and opportunity 
to consume alcohol for hypnotic in-
duction, they appear to behave very 
much in the same way. BAL  (like 
depth reports) will be virtually non-
existent in a situation in which there 
is no opportunity to drink (no hyp-
notic induction) whereas, whilst im-
pulsivity (suggestibility) scores are 
also increased by the opportunity to 
drink (hypnotic induction), scores 
before and after the opportunity to 
drink (induction) are highly  corre-
lated (see, for example, Reed, Levin & 
Evans, 2012).
Not only are depth reports reliable, 
they also have face and construct va-
lidity.  Hence,  unlike the suggestions 
used in standard scales of hypnotic 
suggestibility, depth reports tend to 
be low or absent in situations where 
we would not expect to find hypno-
sis (as previously defined) to any ap-
preciable degree; such as, when there 
is no hypnotic induction procedure 
(Hilgard & Tart, 1988; Wagstaff et 
al., 2008).  Nevertheless, as imagina-
tive suggestions instructions given 
both with and without induction in 
a variety of contexts tend to correlate 
highly and significantly with depth 
reports given after induction (Hilgard 
& Tart, 1966; Tart, 1970; Wagstaff et 
al., 2008), responses to imaginative 
suggestions can still potentially be 
used as a less accurate, indirect, or 
proxy measure of the construct of 
hypnotizability. The idea of proxy or 
indirect measurement is premised on 
the psychometric principle that vari-
ables can be used to predict/measure 
to the extent that they correlate. For 
example, because socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES)  correlates significantly with 
more direct measures of intelligence, 
then  indicators of socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES) can be described as ‘proxy 
measures of intelligence’ (see, for ex-
ample, Jokela, Batty, Deary, Silven-
toinen & Kivimäki, 2011, p. 489) . But 
obviously SES is not the same as In-
telligence, neither are they measured 
using the same procedures. Similarly, 
we can say that depth reports and re-
sponses to imaginative suggestions 
Box 1. Depth Reports
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following hypnotic induction (because, by defini-
tion, hypnotic inductions are designed to increase 
the likelihood that hypnosis will occur).  It is also 
consistent with view that, although hypnotic in-
ductions with the explicit label of ‘hypnosis’ are 
most likely to induce hypnosis, subjects can also 
make the attribution that hypnosis has occurred 
(accept a suggestion for hypnosis) in situations 
that do not involve a formal  induction procedure 
or the explicit label of hypnosis, which a small 
number of subjects do (see, for example, Hilgard 
& Tart, 1966; Wagstaff et al., 2008).  
To be ‘hypnotized’: to be in an alleged al-
tered state of consciousness, normally as-
sociated with increased susceptibility to 
suggestion etc., or to have accepted the 
suggestion that one is in such a condition.   
Again this definition allows a person to 
be ‘hypnotized’ without a formal induction 
procedure.
Finally, suppose we were to accept this kind 
of definition; what might a revised version of the 
first part of the APA definition and description 
look like? Here is one possibility.
Hypnosis can be defined as 1) an alleged 
altered state of consciousness normally 
associated with increased susceptibility 
to suggestion, and changes in sensations, 
perceptions, thoughts, and behaviour, 
or 2) acceptance of the suggestion that 
one is in such a condition.  When us-
ing hypnosis as a procedure, one person 
(the subject) is guided by another (the 
hypnotist) to respond to suggestions 
aimed to bring about such changes.  A 
hypnosis procedure will typically involve 
an introduction to the procedure dur-
ing which the subject is told that sugges-
tions for imaginative experiences will be 
presented.  This is usually followed by a 
hypnotic induction procedure, which is 
a set of instructions and suggestions de-
signed to facilitate entry into the alleged 
hypnotic state, or convey the suggestion 
that one is entering such a condition.  The 
induction is used to encourage and facili-
tate responses to subsequent suggestions.  
Persons can also learn self-hypnosis, 
which is the act of administering hypnot-
ic procedures on one’s own.  If the subject 
responds to suggestions after an induc-
tion procedure, it is generally inferred 
that hypnosis has been induced, though 
subjects can also respond to suggestions 
outside the context of hypnosis.  Many 
believe that the responses and experi-
ences of subjects during hypnosis pro-
cedures are characteristic of a hypnotic 
state, though opinions vary as to whether 
such a state actually exists and whether it 
is useful or necessary to invoke the idea 
of an altered state of hypnosis to account 
for phenomena that are attributed to hyp-
nosis.  Also, while some think that it is 
not necessary to use the word hypnosis 
as part of the hypnotic induction to ef-
fectively facilitate subsequent responses 
to suggestions, others view it as essential.  
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